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A B S T R A C T
This paper focuses on market design options for operational balancing management in self-dispatch electric
power systems. In particular, it investigates the most relevant timing for the balancing gate closure, when
competitors' decisions on the setting of controllable assets are neutralized and this responsibility is simulta-
neously transferred to the system operator. This discussion is central in the development and implementation of
the European Electricity Balancing Guideline. Based on a multi-level simulation tool with a realistic modelling of
short-term power system operations, this paper proposes the first quantitative assessment of postponing the
balancing gate closure time from 1 h to 15min ahead of the imbalance settlement period. For different en-
vironments (energy mix, power plant capabilities, outages, etc), the results highlight that postponing the bal-
ancing gate closure time from 1 h to 15min increases the operational cost of the system. Based on robust and
scalable results, we show that this difference is mainly due to a better coordination of the available resources by
the central decision maker.
1. Introduction
Electric power systems evolve to provide a major share of genera-
tion from intermittent resources where uncertainties on system equili-
bria require careful management owing to widespread controllable
units with a variety of capabilities. In this context, as described in (Bunn
and Kermer, 2018) for example, the cost efficiency of the power system
will be highly dependent on operational decision making with respect
to short-term flexibilities. Operational schemes are generally de-
termined by the regulatory framework within the administrative area.
Where multiple areas with diverse regulations are interconnected,
economic efficiency motivates the coordination of system operation.
In this regard, the European Union has developed and implemented
the Electricity Balancing Guideline (EBGL, 2017). This allows every
member state to maintain practices which conform to local specificities,
but to mandate a strong coordination of the operational schemes used
by local System Operators (SO) to activate balancing services (i.e. re-
quest a greater or lesser injection of electricity from available re-
sources) using standard products. This process has raised the problem of
setting a Balancing Gate Closure Time (BGCT), i.e. when operators of
controllable units must fix their injection setting, propose balancing
services and let the SO take centralised decisions on their activations.
Today, the BCGT varies across European countries: for example, it is set
to 15min In Germany, Belgium and The Netherlands, versus 60min in
France and Finland (ENTSO-E WGAS, 2016). In Europe, the problem
has been bound to select between two options (ACER, 2012): (i) re-
active balancing management, whereby the BGCT would be set 15min
before the beginning of an imbalance settlement period (ISP), or (ii)
proactive balancing management, with the BGCT set 60min before the
ISP. The opportunity to select a single value for Europe has led to in-
tense debate dominated by theoretical views (e.g. (EFET balancing
dream 2017)) on the ability of energy markets to induce efficient op-
erational decisions. Unfortunately, no party has yet proposed a quan-
titative assessment of the two options (CRE, 2016). Advocates of re-
active and proactive balancing management usually refer to the
following dimensions to justify their preferences:
i) Impact of proactive activations on the liquidity of the intraday
market: advocates of reactive TSOs consider that postponing the
BGCT allows market participants to account for the latest in-
formation and continue trading close to real time. This additional
trading opportunity fosters liquidity in continuous intraday mar-
kets, with potential benefits in terms of intraday price formation.
ii) Impact of proactive activations on the cost of activating bal-
ancing services and reserves: advocates of proactive balancing
management consider that TSOs can rely on more resources (i.e.
those who need to be triggered more than 30min before delivery)
to face similar imbalances. Under the assumption of an efficient
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balancing management, this opens the door for benefits in terms of
reserve and activation expenses (CRE, 2016).
iii) Level of transparency towards market parties in self-dispatch:
advocates of proactive balancing management highlight the fact
that the market must rely on limited information to make dispatch
decisions. In the particular instance of balancing, they recall that
the status and capability of each asset is private information. On the
other hand, energy prices (with a 15-min or 30-min granularity)
potentially complemented with alerts in case of forecast scarcity of
balancing reserves, would provide insufficient information for
market participants to make efficient decisions (CRE, 2016).
Unfortunately, no party has yet been able to propose a quantitative
assessment of the two options, and the debates remain qualitative with
no factual comparison of the two approaches in the same context. To
address this issue, and to provide reliable figures to policy makers, we
introduce hereafter the first impact assessment of switching the BGCT.
The study is based on the multi-level optimization tool SiSTEM that
models European short-term electricity markets covering day-ahead
and intraday exchanges, as well as balancing activations in real-time
and imbalance settlement. It embeds detailed processes reflecting the
most relevant complex dimensions of balancing management in power
systems.
Power systems have been studied using various approaches, in-
cluding optimization models, microeconomic equilibrium models and,
more recently, simulation models. One should refer to (Ventosa et al.,
2005) and (Foley et al., 2010) for a review. Among these approaches,
optimization and simulation models (in particular agent-based models)
are particularly suitable for analysis of the short-term functioning of
power markets. SiSTEM is a unique combination of the strengths of
optimization and simulation aiming at precisely modelling short-term
markets, with special attention paid to balancing mechanisms and
various constraints influencing their outcomes.
We present simulation results corresponding to various situations in
terms of generation portfolio, load demand, outages, and capabilities of
power plants, and assess each of the system-wide variable costs of
serving demand with a system managed in a proactive or reactive ap-
proach. We explain the difference in variable costs based on an in-depth
analysis of particular cases and discuss to which extent the results are
robust and scalable. Finally, we provide inputs regarding the most re-
levant gate closure time for balancing.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we detail the bal-
ancing management approaches under consideration according to the
Electricity Balancing Guideline and explain the main differences in
terms of short-term system operation. Section 3 introduces the simu-
lation tool used for the impact assessment. In Section 4, we present case
studies and results in the context of the pending regulatory decisions
with respect to balancing management. In Section 5, we discuss more
generally our results and provide elements for optimal balancing
timing. Section 6 concludes.
2. Background: balancing management in self-dispatch power
systems
Balancing management is inherent to self-dispatch1 power systems,
where all network users must name a balance responsible party (BRP),
and where only BRPs can trade physical energy on wholesale markets.
In this context, the traded energy corresponds to a positive or negative
injection in a specific bidding zone, with no differentiation on the type
and location of the associated grid units, as long as those are located in
the bidding zone. This corresponds to the market design in force in most
of the European Member States, e.g. France, Germany, Belgium and the
Great Britain. A panorama of actual practices in Europe is provided in
(ENTSO-E WGAS, 2016). Based on these practices (Haberg and
Doorman, 2016), propose a classification of balancing market designs:
their quantitative analysis confirms that some European countries are
characterized by a reactive balancing market design (Belgium, Austria,
Germany, The Netherlands) whereas others are more proactive (France,
United Kingdom, Nordic countries).
To ensure system equilibrium (or limit the recourse to ancillary
services2) in operating self-dispatch power systems, SOs usually require
all generators to (i) fix their output ahead of the ISP and (ii) propose
balancing services based on their short-term flexibilities. The timing
when those requirements apply is generally named BGCT. Fig. 1 pre-
sents the timeline of these short-term operations: when the intraday
markets are closed, the balancing window for the SO's actions begins
and typically lasts 15min (“short-window”), 15–60min (“medium
window”) or more than 60min (“long window”). As defined in (EU
2017/1485), resources used to balance the system can be classified into
three types of reserve. Frequency containment reserve corresponds to a
fast and automatic response to stop frequency variations. Frequency
restoration reserve provides energy services to restore the frequency to
its nominal value (50 Hz in Europe). Replacement reserve allows for the
release of assets participating in the previous steps in order to ensure
their availability in case of future imbalances.
We detail hereafter how schedules are updated ahead of and after
the BGCT. We acknowledge that this picture is theoretical and does not
capture all features of specific contexts. Nevertheless, this design fits
with the European Guideline on Electricity Balancing (EBGL, 2017) and
includes main options chosen by several European member states.
2.1. Before the balancing gate closure time
Ahead of the BGCT, significant grid units can set their generation
schedule to conform to their individual forecasts and commitments
through markets. In large bidding zones or well-coupled markets, li-
quidity on day-ahead and intraday markets is relatively high as any
flexible resource may be rewarded for updating their output according
to energy prices.
Except for congestion management, SOs do not trigger any action
likely to affect system balance. They may, however, contract reserves,
i.e. make sure that network users will ultimately offer a minimum vo-
lume of balancing services, a few hours/days/months before delivery.
Reserve procurement is generally portfolio-based so that self-dispatch
applies ultimately not only to injecting/buying energy but also to se-
lecting the units that will provide balancing services.
2.2. After the balancing gate closure time
In some countries, e.g. Germany or France, market parties can still
trade energy after the balancing gate closure time. However, significant
network users can no longer modify their schedule. Liquidity is thus
dramatically reduced in energy markets that remain open.
On the other hand, the SO can finally intervene and manage the
system balance by activating balancing services. This service may rely
on a variety of products (mainly standard ones).1 As defined in (EU 2017/2195), a self-dispatch power system means that “the
generation schedules and consumption schedules as well as dispatching of
power generating facilities and demand facilities are determined by the sche-
duling agents of those facilities”. The self-dispatch system is used in most
European countries. However, Italy, Ireland, Poland and Greece are organised
with central dispatch for the different decision-making horizons, including
balancing (ENTSO-E WGAS, 2016, see page 6).
2 As defined in (Directive 2009/72/EC), ancillary services correspond to “a
service necessary for the operation of a transmission or distribution system”.
Typically, ancillary services include frequency ancillary services and non-fre-
quency ancillary services such as voltage control.
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3. Methodology: modelling short-term operation of self-dispatch
power systems
To perform the efficiency assessment of different balancing man-
agement regimes, we have developed a multi-level simulation model of
European short-term electricity markets, covering day-ahead and in-
traday exchanges, as well as balancing activations and imbalance set-
tlement. This model, hereafter named SiSTEM, explicitly represents
several power companies and their interactions: each company makes
offers, notifies the SO of its generation schedule, and finally proposes
balancing services. After the balancing gate closure, the SO activates
balancing energy to restore the power balance to the system using all
balancing service offers proposed by market participants, including
balancing reserves. The model focuses on frequency restoration re-
serves and replacement reserves, whereas frequency containment re-
serves are out of the scope (see Fig. 1). Imbalance settlement implies
bidirectional transactions between the SO and power companies de-
pending on the direction of their imbalance. The simulation is per-
formed sequentially by modelling operational decisions for each time
step of the considered period.
The following section details the main actions performed in each
time step. A complete description of the model is available in a dedi-
cated publication (Mathieu et al., 2017).
3.1. Differences with respect to pure and perfect competition
Before presenting the modelling and for sake of clarity, this section
explains the differences between the theoretical reference case of pure
and perfect competition with perfect information on the one hand, and
the situation modelled in the SiSTEM tool on the other hand.
Under the assumption of pure and perfect competition, among
which there is perfect information and no transaction costs, decen-
tralized markets provide the same result as a benevolent monopoly, i.e.
the SO. However, in practice, some of these hypotheses do not hold and
real markets differ from this theoretical reference case (e.g. transaction
costs, informational asymmetry).
The SiSTEM tool proposes a modelling of electricity markets which
aims at being as close as possible to real functioning of self-dispatch
power systems. In particular, the informational asymmetry between
generation unit operators and the SO is represented. All market parti-
cipants and the SO have perfect information on the markets' outcomes
(day-ahead and intraday markets): volumes and prices are public in-
formation. Perfect information is also assumed for past balancing ac-
tions taken by the SO.
Each market participant forecasts its own portfolio's consumption
and electricity generation from its non-controllable units (wind, solar,
run-of-river hydropower). This forecast is updated for each simulation
time step (i.e. 15 min) and the related forecast error decreases in time
(see Mathieu et al. (2017) for more details). Based on this information,
power companies can estimate the imbalance between their generation,
consumption and market exchanges, and trade or update their gen-
eration schedule to restore balance. However, the SO takes balancing
decisions based on i) its own forecast of system imbalance, defined as
the difference between positive and negative injections at the system
scale and ii) balancing bids proposed by the market participants.
We have modelled SO forecasts on system balance in such a way
that it does not provide SOs with a competitive advantage against
market participants (i.e. the sum of energy generation minus demand
forecasts by market participants tends to be a more accurate view of
system balance than estimation by the SO). However, collecting all
balancing bids offers the SO full visibility on the flexibility in the
system, whereas each market participant only knows its own flexibility,
but has no visibility on the actual flexibility of its competitors (it only
knows the intraday price for energy).
Because of this informational asymmetry between market partici-
pants and the proactive SO, we expect that simulations carried out with
the SiSTEM tool show differences in terms of efficiency between
proactive and reactive balancing management.
3.2. Representation of power companies
In the model, power companies maximise their revenues while
serving their energy consumption portfolio thanks to energy produced
internally (if they own generation assets) or energy bought on day-head
or intraday markets. To do so, each power company starts by fore-
casting the consumption of its customers and the non-dispatchable
generation of its portfolio. In our model, forecasts are generated from
real-life realisations by overlaying a uniform noise and smoothing the
resulting signal. For the sake of simplicity, power companies offer en-
ergy products (in day-ahead, intraday and balancing markets) based on
generation schedules and their actual generation costs.
3.2.1. Generation scheduling
Based on this forecast, and on previous commitments (exchanges
with other market parties or reserve contracts), each power company
computes its generation schedule. The latter is obtained by solving a
unit commitment problem with 15-min granularity integrating the
constraints of thermal generation units, hydro-electric reservoirs and
Fig. 1. Timeline of short-term operations.
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curtailable renewable generation (typically wind power and PV). The
thermal unit model integrates traditional unit-commitment constraints,
i.e. ramping constraints, start-up/shut-down phases and minimum on
and off times. The model is enhanced by taking into account notifica-
tion delays inherent to many thermal units and steady-state constraints
imposing a constant power output for a minimum duration. Hydro-
electric reservoirs are managed as stocks with various notification de-
lays and time-varying bounds and inflows. The latter are given as
parameters to integrate long-term management constraints into the
short-term management of the water. The value of the stock is linearly
dependent on the stock level. Renewable sources (typically wind power
and PV) are considered as curtailable generation units with no variable
cost.
The scheduling model is computationally challenging since it re-
quires optimizing the output of the whole portfolio taking into account
the constraints of each generation unit on a potentially large horizon. In
practice, the daily scheduled generation planning of the portfolio does
not change every minute as it would be too computationally demanding
and time-consuming for operators. Scheduling is therefore divided into
two parts in the model: short-term and long-term scheduling. They are
both performed with the same resolution, i.e. 15min to precisely study
the impact of balancing. Long-term scheduling allows for the integra-
tion of day-ahead market exchanges and aims at estimating how to
satisfy the demand at lowest cost. Short-term scheduling modifies the
scheduled generation planning of assets over the next 2 h and is per-
formed in every simulation time step. It is used to take into account the
latest accepted intraday market offers until the final net schedule and
the activation of balancing services. Scheduled generation planning of a
power company's asset may vary until the BGCT. Beyond this, the
generation schedule is considered as fixed and can only be modified
when the SO activates balancing offers.
In order to participate in intraday and balancing markets, a power
company needs to price its ability to increase or decrease its generated
power, given its previous commitments and generation planning. To do
so, its scheduled generation planning can be used as reference to
compute to what extent the power company can modify its portfolio's
injection and at what cost. This information is communicated through
explicit offers to the market. An offer is defined, as a minimum, as an
energy volume over a given period with a maximum price for buying or
a minimum price for selling. An offer may span multiple market periods
with different energy volumes, allow only binary acceptance and/or to
be linked to other offers. The offer-building strategy of power compa-
nies can either be portfolio-based or unit-based.
3.2.2. Unit-based offers
The flexibility of a single generation unit is given by the difference
between the initial generation planning and an alternative planning by
either maximising or market minimising the energy generated. This
energy difference in each trading time step is offered as an independent
bid which can be partially accepted at a cost equal to the variable cost
of the generation unit, considering start-up costs if necessary. Thermal
generation units require making block offers; offers covering more than
one trading time step and links between the offers to properly com-
municate the units' constraints.
3.2.3. Portfolio-based offers
For portfolio-based offers, the power company considers all of its
units at the same time to compute its energy market bids. This strategy
enables the offering of more energy products owing to the com-
plementarity between generation assets, but it is more challenging to
model than unit-based offers. Portfolio-based offers are generated based
on a predefined number of generation scenarios as follows. By default,
20 scenarios3 are considered. First, three unit commitments are
performed with three different targets: minimum generation, maximum
generation and getting as close as possible to the scheduled generation
planning. Then, seventeen intermediate scenarios are generated in be-
tween these three scenarios. Unit commitments processed for each
scenario provide the closest possible volumes and the associated costs.
These volumes and costs are then divided into individual offers for each
market time step. The reference scenario is considered as the basis on
which to define the flexible offers and is arbitrarily set to the load
forecast. Volumes above this reference are converted into selling offers.
The difference in volume between the first scenario above the reference
and the reference volume is offered at the difference of the total cost
between the two scenarios divided by the difference of volume over the
whole horizon. The process is repeated for the next scenario, taking the
energy difference with the previous one. Sales offers are generated
using the symmetric process.
The module computing the offers is used both for the intraday
market and to communicate flexibility offers to the SO before real-time.
In this model, this flexibility is communicated as explicit offers similar
to those for the day-ahead and intraday markets. Activation of bids is
subject to various constraints. Binary decisions, links and exclusions
need to be considered. In practice, this complexity is ignored by some
SOs and only basic products are considered. In other countries, like in
France, implicit balancing offers are used. An additional constraint
imposes a notification delay before the activation of some bids to ensure
the availability of the corresponding generation units.
3.3. Market exchanges
Exchanges in the model first occur with the day-ahead energy
market clearing the day before delivery. Typically, the gate closure for
submitting bids occurs at midday and results are provided 30min later.
In SiSTEM, the clearing of the day-ahead market is formulated as
mixed-integer linear program aiming at maximising the market surplus.
This optimization problem is a primal-dual formulation able to si-
multaneously include constraints on the volumes and prices in the
formulation.
After the clearing of the day-ahead market, e.g. at 15:00, the in-
traday market opens for the next day. In most European countries, the
real intraday market is a continuous market where offers are updated
continuously by the market participants. In our model, the intraday
market is implemented as a series of auctions taking place at every si-
mulation time step, i.e. every 15min. The clearing is solved using the
same formulation of the DA optimization clearing problem. These
procedures provide a price at each intraday market clearing for each
opened intraday market period. An indicative intraday price is built for
a given delivery time step by taking the weighted average over the
volumes exchanged in each intraday auction. We believe that this
modelling provides a realistic approximation of the functioning of
continuous markets in the real world.
3.4. System operator
The SO ensures the balance between generation and consumption in
real time. To this end, it must ensure that sufficient balancing services
will be proposed by market parties, and therefore contracts balancing
reserves. In this study, the volume of reserve that each market party
must provide is defined as an input of the simulation tool that does not
vary between the investigated scenarios (and thus, the reservation cost
is not included in the cost analysis of the results). Power companies
include the reserve volumes as a constraint when providing the sche-
dule of their units.
Based on the current system imbalance and on its own forecasts of
3 The default number of scenarios was chosen to be sufficiently high to
(footnote continued)
provide relevant energy offers while keeping a reasonable computing time.
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future imbalances, the SO activates available balancing services, par-
tially or totally, while respecting notice delays of generation units. The
forecasted imbalances are assumed to be equal to the average of the five
last recorded values, and do not depend on the more-detailed forecasts
made by the various power companies. The SO restores balance while
minimising balancing energy cost, taking into account technical con-
straints and uncertainties on future system imbalances. The cheapest
offers are selected to provide upward balancing, while downward bal-
ancing is preferably obtained by decreasing the generation of the most
expensive asset as of the last schedules. To make its decisions, the SO
considers its impact on the future. More details on the optimization
problem guiding the actions of the is provided in (Mathieu et al., 2017).
Balancing activations have a cost which is transferred to power
companies via the imbalance settlement mechanism. Before the BGCT,
a power company communicates the schedule of all its significant units
to the SO, resulting from the latest unit commitment and exchanges.
The imbalance of a power company is given by the difference between
its realized generation output and its last generation schedule declared
to the SO. A positive imbalance, e.g. too much injection, leads to a
payment by the SO to the power company proportional to the positive
imbalance price. A negative imbalance, e.g. not enough injection, leads
to a payment by the power company to the SO proportional to the
negative imbalance price. SiSTEM allows for defining the imbalance
pricing scheme using any function of the balancing activation costs. The
default rule is the single-price approach currently in force in France and
described in (RTE, 2017).
3.5. Use of SiSTEM to assess proactive and reactive balancing regime
To assess the technical and economic impact of shifting the BGCT in
a self-dispatch power system and using SiSTEM, we have simulated the
short-term operation of a virtual power system capturing the com-
plexity of a real-world power system. To limit the computational
burden, we have considered systems with a limited number of assets,
encompassing a wide range of technologies, i.e. renewables, nuclear,
gas, fuel, coal, and hydro power plants, and the corresponding opera-
tional constraints and outage series. We have limited the simulation to
one month with a 15-min granularity.
We considered, as the main outcome, the overall variable cost of
operating the system to satisfy the demand defined as input. This
consists essentially of fuel costs, emission costs and stock value for the
final stock of water of hydroelectric assets. As emphasized in
(Caramanis et al., 1982), in a system with pre-defined demand, this
performance indicator is the best proxy of the system's socio-economic
welfare: the lower the overall variable cost, the higher the socio-eco-
nomic welfare.
Because the SiSTEM simulation tool relies on MILP solvers with non-
deterministic behaviour, it may lead to slightly different results for two
runs with the same setting. This difference is characterized in (Mathieu
et al., 2017). To limit the simulation bias below 0.05% in terms of
average overall variable costs, we have therefore performed 30 runs for
each case.4 The assessment presented in Section 4.3 corresponds to the
average from the 30 runs.
4. Case studies and data
The case study is designed to be as close as possible to the actual
functioning of power systems. However, the detailed cost and technical
parameters of generation units are based on literature reviews, so
should not be considered as representative of a specific, actual power
system. In practice, these parameters depend on the context (time, lo-
calization, macroeconomic situation, etc.), which may vary with time
and location. They are therefore complex to estimate.
4.1. Load demand
We consider two types of net demand curves based on French his-
torical data.5 To obtain the net demand curves, generation from fatal
units (cogeneration and run-of-river hydroelectric plants) are sub-
tracted from the demand curves.
• Winter demand: we used 5% of the typical net load demand in
France, corresponding to meteorological conditions from January 3,
2014 through to February 3, 2014. This leads to a maximum and
minimum net demand of 4.81 GW and 2.65 GW, respectively.• Summer demand: we used 5% of the typical net load demand in
France from June 3, 2014 through to July 3, 2014. This leads to a
maximum and minimum net demand of 3.04 GW and 1.56 GW, re-
spectively.
4.2. Generation constraints
The SiSTEM model allows one to represent the functioning of gen-
eration units in detail. Generation technologies are modelled with the
features presented in Table 1 for nuclear and thermal technologies and
in Table 2 for hydropower. Cost and technical parameters are in line
with (IEA and NEA, 2015), (Schröder et al., 2013) and (Schill et al.,
2016) for nuclear generation.
Each parameter was scaled to represent a standard real-life unit,
except for the minimum power that was decreased, importantly, to take
into account the aggregation of various real-life units. As a con-
sequence, start-up costs were scaled accordingly with minimum power.
Wind and PV are modelled as non-dispatchable power generation:
the generated volume is defined through their load factor for each si-
mulation time step.
Note that we have simulated an alternative flexibility scenario with
less flexible gas units. In this case, referred to as “No flex gas”, the
notice delay is set to 15min for CCGT (A or B types) and to 5min for
OCGT. In this context, the SO can activate balancing services from
OCGT within 15min whereas CCGT cannot provide it within this time
period.
We have considered random outages according to the risk level
identified as the parameter for each generation unit. The series were
generated independently for each generation mix considered for the
simulations. The outage series under consideration are fully detailed in
Annex A. However, beyond the random outages, planned maintenance
is not taken into account.
4.3. Generation mix and power company portfolios
We have considered two different generation mixes characterized
by the parameters presented in Table 3. The assets are owned by four
different power companies, as detailed in Tables 4 and 5. Power com-
panies A and B have generating units and consumers in their portfolios,
whereas power company C is a pure supplier and power company D has
the entire renewable production but no consumers. Regarding the de-
finition of the day-ahead market offers, power company A uses a
portfolio-based calculation, whereas other companies use unit-based
calculations. For all other markets (intraday, balancing), the offer de-
finitions are unit-based.
4 We performed 100 runs of the same simulation and compared the overall
variable cost on average over the 100 runs and over a limited number of runs.
The average value obtained for 30 runs varies from the one of 100 runs by only
0.05%.
5 Available on eco2mix website provided by RTE: http://www.rte-france.
com/en/eco2mix/eco2mix.
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4.4. Summary of the scenarios
The five scenarios under consideration are characterized in Table 6.
These various scenarios allow one to cover a wide range of situations
and to estimate the robustness of the results.
5. Results and discussion
From a social welfare point of view, the efficiency of the balancing
management options can be estimated through the overall variable
costs to serve the electricity demand profile. More precisely, this overall
Table 1
Parameters of the generation technologies in the base case regarding flexibility.
Variable cost Startup cost Power range Ramp rate On time Off time Steady period Notice delay
€/MWh k€ MW MW/h h h min min
Nuclear A 10 32 [25; 1300] 2400 72 24 120 30
Nuclear B 12 22 [20; 900] 1800 72 24 120 30
Lignite 16 15 [15; 500] 2400 24 12 120 30
Coal 20 3 [15; 300] 210 8 8 60 45
CCGT A 28 2.1 [20; 400] 1020 4 4 15 5
CCGT B 30 1 [10; 200] 1020 4 4 15 5
OCGT 150 0.5 [10; 180] 720 0 0.5 15 30
Table 2







€/MWh €/MWh MW min
Hydro manual [20; 120] 50 0 180
Hydro remote [20; 120] 50 0 5
N.B.
a The water value is used for dispatch decisions.
b The stock value is used to value the water stock at the end of the simulation
in order to compare two cases with different water uses.
Table 3
Parameters of the generation mix and reserves.
Mix name “Nuclear + RES + Gas” “RES + Coal + Gas”
Total installed capacity 5.82 8.58
Nuclear capacity (GW) 3.10 0.90
Lignite capacity (GW) 0.00 1.00
Coal capacity (GW) 0.30 1.80
Gas capacity (GW) 0.80 1.20
Fuel capacity (GW) 0.36 0.18
Hydro capacity (GW) 0.50 0.00
Wind capacity (GW) 0.50 1.50
PV Capacity (GW) 0.26 2.00
Upward reserve: total (GW) 0.15 0.30
Gas capacity (GW) 0.10 0.15
Hydro capacity (GW) 0.05 0.00




Nuclear (GW) 0.10 0.00
Gas capacity (GW) 0.00 0.20
Table 4
Generation and load portfolios of the 4 power companies in the case
“Nuclear + RES + Gas”.
Power company A B C D
Nuclear A (GW) 1.30
Nuclear B (GW) 1.80
Coal (GW) 0.30
CCGT A (GW) 0.40
CCGT B (GW) 0.20 0.20
OCGT (GW) 0.36
Hydro manual (GW) 0.10
Hydro remote (GW) 0.40
Wind (GW) 0.50
PV (GW) 0.26
Winter peak load (GW) 3.59 0.71 0.51 0.00
Summer peak load (GW) 1.16 0.22 0.18 0.00
Table 5
Generation and load portfolios of the 4 power companies in the case
“RES + Coal + Gas”.
Power company A B C D
Nuclear A (GW) 0.90
Lignite (GW) 0.50 0.50
Coal (GW) 1.20 0.60
CCGT A (GW) 0.40 0.40




Winter peak load (GW) 3.59 0.71 0.51 0.00
Summer peak load (GW) 1.16 0.22 0.18 0.00
Table 6
Description of the scenarios.
Demand Gen flexibility Mix Outage
Scenario A Winter Base case “Nuclear + RES + Gas” S1
Scenario B Summer Base case “Nuclear + RES + Gas” S1
Scenario C Winter No flex gas “Nuclear + RES + Gas” S1
Scenario D Winter Base case “Nuclear + RES + Gas” S2
Scenario E Winter Base case “RES + Coal + Gas” S3
Table 7
Simulation results in terms of overall variable costs and inefficiency rate.







Scenario A 36,531 36,636 0.29
Scenario B 22,317 22,373 0.25
Scenario C 36,592 36,761 0.43
Scenario D 36,518 36,678 0.43
Scenario E 41,817 41,851 0.08
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variable cost includes the variable fuel costs, the start-up costs, the
valuation of the hydro stock (50€/MWh) at the end of the test period,
and the value of lost load (3000 €/MWh).
As detailed in Table 7, the 60-min BGCT has the lowest overall
variable cost of the five considered scenarios. To compare the two BGCT
options, we define the cost inefficiency of the 15-min BGCT compared
to the 60-min BGCT as the difference in the overall variable cost divided
by one of the 60-min BGGT. The inefficiency rate of the 15-min BGCT,
presented in Table 7, varies from 0.08% to 0.43% in the five considered
scenarios.
The differences in overall variable cost observed between a 60-min
BGCT and 15-min BGCT might be considered relatively low. However,
as overall variable costs represent significant expenses in real-world
systems (e.g. approximately €70 billion/year to serve 3500 TWh in
Europe), a loss of efficiency of 0.3% would correspond to €210 million/
year on the European scale.
The difference in overall variable cost between 15-min BGCT and
60-min BGCT (0.1%–0.4%) persists with various simulation cases and
for two different generation mixes. Thus, the fact that 60-min BGCT is
more efficient than 15-min BGCT appears as a robust result. We explain
this difference through the relative inefficiency of decentralized deci-
sions, based on an incomplete view of the system state during the final
hour ahead of real time.
Further investigation has demonstrated that the accuracy of the
forecast of SOs vs. individual forecasts by power companies cannot
explain such a difference. Indeed, as depicted in Table 8, 60min before
the ISP, SOs tend to have less-accurate predictions than the sum of
predictions by the power companies.
The greater efficiency of centralised decision-making, between 60-
min and 15-min ahead of the ISP, relates in practice to the lack of co-
ordination between competitors who face uncertainty of their own
commitments and do not have any visibility on the flexibility of other
market participants. In our simulations, this materialises in practice in
numerous activations/de-activations of flexibilities by market parties in
the time frame where a proactive SO would have a complete view of
available resources to manage the balance (prices, volumes but also
notice delays for flexible units and ramping capabilities). The corre-
sponding trades on intraday markets can lead to inefficient operational
decisions, in particular for assets with start-up delays over 15min and
below 60min. This is illustrated in Fig. 2, which depicts both the bal-
ancing activations made by the SO and the changes made by power
companies during the final hour in the case “15-min BGCT” (either
internal changes of the generation schedule, or exchanges through in-
traday markets) in Scenario A. This figure confirms that, as expected,
the volume of activations by the SO is greater in the “60-min BGCT”
case as the SO faces a higher imbalance (see Table 8). However, by
depicting schedule changes decided by power companies between t-
60min and t-15min in the “15-min BGCT” case (see the light blue area
in Fig. 2), the Figure shows that actions taken during the final hour are
significantly more numerous in volume in the “15-min BGCT” case than
in the “60-min BGCT” case.
Finally, we note that a 60-min BGCT generally leads to a greater
number of balancing energy activations by the SO, which leads
potentially to higher “balancing energy costs”, as identified by ACER in
(ACER/CEER, 2017). However, a 15-min BGCT involves many decen-
tralized decisions likely to significantly increase the energy procure-
ment cost in a “reactive” balancing management scheme (see light blue
area in Fig. 2), which should duly be taken into account by policy
makers if they intend to maximise social welfare.
5.1. Detailed analysis (scenario A)
This section analyses the results obtained for Scenario A in detail. To
keep our analysis concise and informative, results of other scenarios are
not detailed here, but, as presented above, all results follow the same
trend. Scenario A corresponds to a winter month for the
“Nuclear + RES + Gas” mix as described in Section 4. As previously
mentioned, for each scenario, 30 runs are carried out to ensure the
robustness of the analysis. The boxplot of the overall variable cost for
“60-min BGCT” and “15-min BGCT” is provided in Fig. 3. It confirms
the significance and the robustness in the cost difference between the
two BGCT options.
The difference in cost between “60-min BGCT” and “15-min BGCT”
is from a different use of generation units to serve the demand, espe-
cially during the balancing period (one to 2 h prior to real-time). The
detailed analysis of the units' dispatch shows that, on average, there is
one supplementary start-up of an OCTG in the “15-min BGCT” case
compared to the “60-min BGCT” case.
The difference between day-ahead or intraday energy prices and
balancing activation costs provides a relevant insight into how to esti-
mate to what extent market participants have a good anticipation of
real-time equilibria. A tighter delta allows a better coordination by the
market. Results presented in Table 9 confirm that this difference is
reduced, hence a better coordination with the case “60-min BGCT”.
5.2. Discussion
The results presented above show that the efficiency of short-term
decisions, as reflected by the overall variable cost, depends on the
timing for the balancing gate closure. Thus, it suggests that there is an
optimal timing for the balancing gate closure (and the corresponding
intraday market gate closure) which intrinsically varies depending on
the generation mix and flexibility requirements. Owing to simulation
time issues, we could not empirically estimate this optimal timing based
on simulations. However, some elements on the definition of the op-
timal timing are provided in this section.
As previously mentioned, operational decisions based on individual
forecasts and on energy prices are more likely to be inefficient com-
pared to operational decisions based on physical imbalance forecasts
with a full picture of system capabilities and costs, in particular for
assets with start-up delays which are longer than the period between
the BGCT and the delivery time (real-time). Indeed, generation units
have dynamic constraints that prevent power companies or the system
operator from changing the generation plan close to real-time. In par-
ticular, the steady period significantly influences the ability of power
units to provide flexibility. Thus, this suggests that decentralized ac-
tions should end so that the system operator still has sufficient time to
change the generation dispatch, if necessary, to balance the system. In
that respect, the BGCT should be defined in line with the delays ne-
cessary to change the generation dispatch of relevant technologies to be
used for balancing. Given the dynamic constraints of typical generation
units, a BGCT of 60min–90min prior to delivery could be an adequate
timing.
6. Conclusions and policy implications
Focusing on market design options for operational balancing man-
agement in self-dispatch electric power systems, this article investigates
the most relevant timing for the balancing gate closure, when market
Table 8
Root mean square error (in MW) of SOs and of power companies depending on





Power company 1 46.3 43.8
Power company 2 9.8 8.9
Power company 3 6.5 6.4
Power company 4 5.0 4.8
Sum of power companies' anticipations 51.3 49.1
TSO in the case “60-min BGCT” 65.6 47.0
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participants' decisions on the setting of controllable assets are neu-
tralized and this responsibility is simultaneously transferred to the
system operator. This discussion is central in the development and
implementation of the European electricity balancing guideline and is
expected to be made European standard (EBGL, 2017). Advocates of the
different balancing options generally draw on qualitative assertions
(EFET balancing dream 2017; CRE 2016) regarding (i) impact on the
liquidity of the intraday market, (ii) impacts on the cost of activating
balancing services and reserves and (iii) level of transparency. To in-
form this debate, this article quantifies the effects of two different short-
term market designs which only differ on the balancing gate closure
time.
Our analysis is based on a multi-level optimization tool called
SiSTEM with a realistic modelling of short-term power system opera-
tions (see (Mathieu et al., 2017) for a detailed description of the model).
The results allow for proposing the first quantitative assessment of
postponing the balancing gate closure time from 1 h (“60-min BGCT”
case) to 15min ahead of the imbalance settlement period (“15-min
BGCT” case). For different environments (energy mix, power plant
capabilities, outages), the results highlight that central decision making
during the final hour ahead of real-time is consistently more economical
than maintaining self-dispatch driven by competitive short-term mar-
kets closer to real-time. More precisely, the overall variable cost ap-
pears to be 0.08%–0.43% higher in the “15-min BGCT” case than in the
“60-min BGCT” case, depending on the considered simulation scenario.
The detailed analysis of the results shows that this difference in cost is
mainly due to a better coordination of the available resources by the
central decision maker than by decentralized power companies.
In future works, we intend to evaluate the cross-zonal impacts of
interconnecting two bidding zones with different BGCTs. We believe
this assessment will be useful to evaluate whether BGCTs should be
Fig. 2. Details on the changes and balancing activations (total over the simulated period – in GWh) during the last hour, in scenario A.
Fig. 3. Overall variable cost (M€) in scenario A for the case 60-min BGCT and 15-min BGCT.
Table 9
Difference (mean value and standard deviation) between balancing activation
costs (BAC_+ for upward activations and BAC_- for downward activations) and
intraday or day-ahead energy prices, in scenario A, in €/MWh.
60-min BGCT 15-min BGCT
ID price - BAC_+ mean 0,46 1,02
st. dev 16,07 16,00
ID price - BAC_- mean −2,24 −2,86
st. dev 14,38 14,39
DA price - BAC_+ mean −1,24 −1,49
st. dev 6,17 5,85
DA price - BAC_- mean −3,15 −3,69
st. dev 7,08 6,57
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fully harmonized among interconnected countries.
Disclaimer
The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the
authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the partners of the CEEM,
nor the official position of EDF (Électricité de France).
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Appendix A. Details on the outages' series used in the simulations
We suppose that only nuclear (type B), CCGT (types A and B), coal and lignite face outages. The outage's parameters used in the simulations are
detailed in Table 10.
Table 10
Outage's parameters depending on the technology.
Yearly probability of outage Duration of outage (h) Out of service capacity (%)
Nuclear B 0.05 7 25
CCGT A 0.05 3 50
CCGT B 0.05 3 100
Coal 0.075 7 35
Lignite 0.075 7 35
A.1 Outages' series used for the simulations with the generation mix “Nuclear + RES + Gas”
Table 11
Outages with the generation mix “Nuclear + RES + Gas”.
Nuclear CCGT Coal
Number of outages – S1 winter period 10 27 4
Number of outages – S1 summer period 12 25 7
Number of outages – S2 winter period 10 28 4
Table 12
Details on outages' scenario S1 – winter period.
Unit Power company Number of outages Out of service capacity (MW) Date of outages (MM/DD hh:mm)






























CCGT B unit 2 B 7 200 01/04 13:00
01/06 12:45
(continued on next page)
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Table 12 (continued)











Details on outages' scenario S1 – summer period.
Unit Power company Number of outages Out of service capacity (MW) Date of outages (MM/DD hh:mm)













































Details on outages' scenario S2.
Unit Power company Number of outages Out of service capacity (MW) Date of outages (MM/DD hh:mm)




Nuclear B unit 2 A 6 225
(continued on next page)
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Table 14 (continued)







































A.2 Outages' series used for the simulations with the generation mix “RES + Coal + Gas”
Table 15
Outages with the generation mix “RES + Coal + Gas”.
Nuclear CCGT A CCGT B Coal Lignite
Number of outages 4 19 12 15 12
Table 16
Details on outages' scenario S3.
Unit Power company Number of outages Out of service capacity (MW) Date of outages (MM/DD hh:mm)
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Table 16 (continued)























Coal unit 2 A 3 210 01/03 04:00
01/19 02:45
01/22 01:00
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